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Resumo: Para Aristóteles, conhecimento demonstrativo é o resultado do que ele denomina 
'aprendizado intelectual', processo em que o conhecimento da conclusão depende de um 
conhecimento prévio das premissas. Dado que demonstrações são, em última instância, baseadas 
em princípios indemonstráveis (cujo conhecimento é denominado 'νοῦς'), Aristóteles é 
frequentemente retratado como promovendo uma doutrina fundacionista. Sem contestar a 
nomenclatura, tentarei mostrar que o 'fundacionismo' de Aristóteles não deve ser entendido como 
uma teoria racionalista da justificação epistêmica, como se os primeiros princípios da ciência 
pudessem ser conhecidos enquanto tais independentemente de suas conexões explanatórias com 
proposições demonstráveis. Argumentarei que conhecer os primeiros princípios enquanto tais 
envolve conhecê-los como explicações de outras proposições científicas. Explicarei, então, de que 
modo conhecimento noético e conhecimento demonstrativo são, em certo sentido, estados 
cognitivos interdependentes – ainda que o conceito de νοῦς se mantenha distinto de (e, nas 
palavras de Aristóteles, mais 'preciso' do que) conhecimento demonstrativo.  
Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; fundacionismo; ciência; demonstração. 
 
Abstract: For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual 
learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of 
the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the 
knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist 
doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s 
‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first 
principles of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to 
demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing 
them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and 
demonstrative knowledge arein a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς 
remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge. 
Keywords: Aristotle; foundationalism; science; demonstration.  
 
 
 
Aristotle is often thought to have accepted some form of 
‘foundationalism.’1In the Posterior Analytics (hereafter APo), he focuses on the 
notion of ‘demonstration’ (ἀπόδειξις), an argument in which the premises 
present the cause or the explanation (αἴτιον) of the conclusion. The knowledge 
we acquire through demonstrations is the result of what Aristotle calls 
‘intellectual learning’ (μάθησις διανοητικὴ), in which the knowledge of the 
                                                 
1 See Irwin (1988, 130-131); Ferejohn (1991, 4-5; 2009, 66); Goldin (2013). 
Dissertatio, UFPel [44 | 2016] 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
188 
conclusion is based on previous knowledge of the premises (APo I 1, 71a1-9). 
According to him, if the ordered pair ⟨Π, c⟩ is a demonstration – where Π is a 
set of premises and c is the conclusion –, the set Π is finite, and c is obtained 
through finitely many steps. If so, there is a subset of Π – let us say Π’ – such 
that, whereas all the members of Π’ are indemonstrable, all the other premises 
in Π (and consequently c) are directly or indirectly demonstrated from 
them.2Although these basic premises are indemonstrable (APo I 2, 71b 26-7), 
we do have knowledge of them by a non-demonstrative cognitive state called 
‘intelligence’ (νοῦς, APo II 19, 100b 5-17). 
In APo I 3, Aristotle discusses two possible reactions to the principle 
that every intellectual learning (including learning by demonstration) comes 
from pre-existing knowledge. One of them is to be come sceptical about the 
possibility of demonstrative knowledge on the grounds that demonstrating is a 
process that leads to infinite regress. The other is to accept circular 
explanations as authentic demonstrations and thus maintain that 
demonstrative knowledge is possible. Aristotle agrees with the second view 
with regard to the possibility of demonstrative knowledge, but denies that 
circular demonstrations are properly explanatory. According to him, the 
relation ‘…being explanatory of…’ is asymmetrical: if a proposition p1 is 
explanatory of p2 (and p1 is a premise from which p2 is demonstrated), p2 is 
not explanatory of p1 (and hence is not a premise from which p1 can be 
demonstrated).3 Similarly, Aristotle agrees with the first view to some extent: 
an infinite demonstration could not produce knowledge insofar as we could 
not survey its premises with thought.4 However, that does not mean that 
demonstrative knowledge is impossible. Aristotle prefers to reject their 
common assumption that all premises in a demonstration must be themselves 
known by demonstration. 
Thus, it is not without reason that the word ‘foundationalism’ has 
been used to describe Aristotle’s conception of scientific knowledge. The very 
idea of there being basic indemonstrable principles in science is commonly 
associated with foundationalist doctrines. It is far from clear, however, how 
exactly Aristotle thinks we can learn ‘by demonstration.’5 Depending on how 
this process of learning is specified, the epistemological alternative Aristotle 
offers in APo I 3 can be seriously misinterpreted, rendering his theory 
inconsistent and unattractive. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall 
attempt to show that the ‘foundationalism’ endorsed in APo I 3 should not be 
taken as a theory on epistemic justification. That is to say, Aristotle does not 
                                                 
2APo I 3, 72b 18-25; I 19, 82a 2-9; I 22, 83b 24-84b 2. 
3Aristotle says that ‘an explanation is prior to what it is explanatory of’ (τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον πρότερονοὗ 
αἴτιον, APo II 16, 98b 17), and priority is an asymmetrical relation (Cat. 12, 14ª 29-35; 14b 11-22; Met. V 
11, 1019a 1-4; VII 10, 1034b 30-32; 1035b 6-7). See also APo I 3, 72b 25-73a 20; APr II 16. 
4APo I 3, 72b 7-15; I 22, 82b 37- 83a 1; 83b 6-7, 83b 32 - 84a 6. 
5APo I 18, 81a40; Metaphysics I 9, 992b 30-33. 
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endorse the view that having demonstrative knowledge of c is to justify the 
belief that c is true by showing that it follows (deductively) from self-evident 
premises that can be known without any previous justification. As I shall 
argue, such (rationalist) view contradicts Aristotle’s own (empiricist) account 
of how we acquire knowledge of first principles. Like demonstrative 
knowledge, νοῦς is also the result of intellectual learning, and hence requires 
pre-existing knowledge (and ultimately perceptual knowledge). Rather, to be an 
Aristotelian foundationalist is to accept the existence of primary explanatory 
factors in the world, also known as ‘essences.’ I shall follow other 
commentators and argue that the status of any premise p as a first principle 
does not rely (primarily) on a feature that p has in itself (such as being self-
evident or analytically true), but depends on p having or not having 
explanatory relations with other propositions within the science in question. 
Correspondingly, what counts as an essence for Aristotle cannot be identified 
as such independently of its status as a cause. I shall then explain in which way 
this picture implies that νοῦς and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense 
interdependent cognitive states – even though, νοῦς remains distinct from 
(and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge. 
 
1. A Rationalist Interpretation of Aristotle’s Foundationalism 
According to the common contemporary view, someone learns 
something through a deductive argument ⟨Π, c⟩ when she, without previously 
knowing c to be true, finds it to be true by (i) knowing in advance that the 
premises in Π are true and (ii) realizing that c is a logical consequence of Π. 
Naturally, this view has been imputed to Aristotle and his theory of 
demonstration: 
 
Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence 
conception of demonstration meant to apply to all 
demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which 
normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be 
true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises 
known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning 
showing by deductively evident steps that its conclusion is a 
consequence of its premises (CORCORAN, 2009, 1). 
 
In the same vein, some interpreters believed that Aristotle’s 
foundationalism implies that the indemonstrable principles of science are self-
evident premises whose truth is known by non-inferential procedures and 
from which the scientist infers and therefore learns other propositions not 
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previously known to be true.6 This interpretation might seem congenial to the 
fact that, in his theory, demonstrations proceed from definitions:7 
 
The principles of demonstrations are definitions, and it has 
been proved earlier that there will not be demonstrations of 
principles – either the principles will be demonstrable and 
there will be principles of principles, and this will continue ad 
infinitum, or else the primitives will be indemonstrable 
definitions [APo II 3, 90b 24-7; Barnes 1993]. 
 
Certain definitional statements (usually called ‘nominal definitions’) 
are meant to fix the meaning of the terms used in scientific discourse. Such 
statements can be described as analytic and knowable a priori. Hence, their 
status as first principles would rely primarily on self-evidence. According to 
this view, the intuitive knowledge we have of propositions of this kind is what 
Aristotle calls ‘νοῦς’, from which ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική is (deductively) 
derived. Since these two cognitive states are the highest forms of knowledge 
(APo II 19, 100b5-9), it is easy to understand why Aristotle was once seen as 
‘the paradigm of an extreme rationalist’, who would recognise a posteriori truths 
as knowable (if at all) ‘only in a debased sense of knowledge.’8 
However, if this is the process of intellectual learning by which we 
acquire demonstrative knowledge, Aristotle’s foundationalist project seems 
blatantly inconsistent. As we saw, if ⟨Π, c⟩ is a demonstration, the set of 
premises Π reveals the appropriate explanation of the conclusion c. However, 
the philosopher believes we cannot start pursuing the explanans without 
knowing in advance that the corresponding explanandum is true (see APo II 1-
2). Thus, how could a demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ enable us to learn c in the first 
place if knowing that c is true is a necessary condition for investigating the 
very explanation the set Π is expected to display?9 
The apparent inadequacy of Aristotle’s account seems to lie with his 
assumption that the explanans is revealed by the premises of a demonstration, 
whereas the explanandum is found in the conclusion. Such assumption seems to 
violate our modern intuitions about how knowledge of causal or explanatory 
relations is acquired. For instance, modern philosophers of science such as 
Charles Pierce distinguish between three kinds of arguments:10 
 
 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Scholz (1975); Irwin (1988, 130-131). 
7 See also APo I 2, 72a 14-24; I 8, 75b 30-1; I 32, 89a 16-9; II 3, 90b 30-3; APo II 8, 93b 6-7, 12; II 17, 99a 
3-5, 21-6. 
8Frede (1996, 157-158). 
9 Barnes (1969, 146);Burnyeat (1981, 116-7). For a helpful exposition of the problem, see Bronstein 
(2014, 13; 2016, 32-33). 
10 See Pierce (Collected Papers; 2. 622-623) 
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Deduction: 
All the beans from this bag are white, These beans are from this bag 
These beans are white 
Induction: 
These beans are from this bag, These beans are white 
All the beans from this bag are white 
Abduction: 
All the beans from this bag are white, These beans are white 
These beans are from this bag 
In a deductive argument such as the one formulated above, the 
premises state a general rule (all the beans from this bag are white) and a case 
under the rule (these beans are from this bag), whereas the conclusion is 
obtained by applying the general rule to the particular case (these beans are 
white).11 Inductive arguments, on the other hand, obtain a general rule (all the 
beans from this bag are white) from a number of cases of which certain facts 
are simultaneously true (these beans are from this bag, these beans are white). 
Finally, abduction is a kind of reasoning that could be described as ‘the 
process of forming explanatory hypotheses’12 or as an ‘inference to the best 
explanation.’13 Suppose we find a handful of white beans on a table next to a 
bag of beans, knowing, in addition, that all the beans from this bag are white. 
In that case, we are inclined to infer that the beans lying on the table came 
from the bag simply because this conclusion, if true, would best explain why 
these beans are white. Thus, abductive inferences produce causal knowledge 
insofar as the conclusions are explanatory of one or more of their premises. In 
the APo, on the other hand, the premises are explanatory of the conclusion 
and not the other way around, which seems to invert the order in which 
arguments are supposed to produce knowledge. 
This picture explains why the interpretation advanced by Jonathan 
Barnes (1969) has been so influential. Barnes argued that the APo are not 
meant to describe how scientists acquire knowledge, nor does it intend to 
account for scientific research. Instead, ‘the theory of demonstration offers a 
formal account of how an achieved body of knowledge should be presented 
and taught.’14 This solution is attractive. Without violating our intuitions about 
how causal knowledge is acquired, it explains why it is possible to learn things 
‘by demonstration’: demonstrative arguments do not reflect the order in which 
the expert scientist reaches his explanations, but the order in which she 
imparts these explanations to her pupils. 
                                                 
11 See Pierce (Collected Papers; 2. 620). 
12Pierce (Collected Papers; 5.172). 
13Harman (1965). 
14Barnes (1969, 147). 
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However, if demonstrating were essentially a pedagogic procedure, it 
would not be good one. Aristotle makes it clear that the premises of a 
demonstration are more familiar and prior to the conclusion precisely because 
they are explanatory of it (APo I 2, 71b 31-2). In this context, the explanatory 
priority of the premises corresponds to what Aristotle describes as priority ‘by 
nature’ and what is prior and more familiar ‘by nature’ (τῇφύσει), says he, is 
not the same as what is prior and more familiar ‘to us’ (πρὸς ἡμᾶς, APo I 2, 
71b 33- 72a 5).  The premises of a demonstration are not more familiar and 
prior to the conclusion in the sense of being obviously true and more likely to 
be accepted by someone who is not yet an expert on the subject in question. 
They are prior and more familiar ‘by nature’ insofar as they display the cause of 
the fact expressed in the conclusion – see ‘εἴπερ αἴτια’ in APo I 2, 71b 31 –, a 
cause that not even the expert knows from the start, but grasps only after a 
complex procedure of inquiry. In other words, what counts as an αἴτιον for 
Aristotle is prior to the phenomenon it explains in an objective sense and 
independently of the way the phenomenon was discovered in the first place. 
To some extent, this is a problem of philosophical vocabulary. 
Foundationalism is usually depicted as a theory of how knowledge and true 
beliefs are justified, whereas Aristotelian explanations cannot be confounded 
with mere justification. Mere justifications provide answers to questions such 
as ‘why do I believe that p?’. Aristotelian explanations, on the other hand, are 
meant to answer the question ‘why is it the case that p?’ (see GOLDIN 2013, 
200). In order to justify my belief in a proposition p, all I need is to set out the 
reasons why I believe in p. On the other hand, for Aristotle, to present the 
αἴτιον of p is to identify a real-world item that is responsible for p being true 
(instead of being responsible for my knowledge that p is true).15 Premises that 
are explanatory in this strong sense are certainly not self-evident or knowable a 
priori. Therefore, when interpreted according to the rationalist approach 
depicted above, Aristotle’s foundationalism becomes incompatible with his 
own concept of explanation. If his solution to the dilemma of APo I 3 is to be 
labelled as a form of foundationalism at all, it seems preferable to specify what 
kind of foundationalism it is not in terms of justification, but in terms of 
causal explanations. 
 
 
                                                 
15 On the difference between justification and explanation, see Burnyeat (1981, 101); Goldin (2013, 200). 
For other interpretations that claim or assume that this is the notion of explanation present in Aristotle’s 
theory of demonstration, see Kosman (1973); Matthen (1981); Taylor (1990, 120); McKirahan (1992, 
209-31); Lesher (2001, 46); Charles (2000); Bronstein (2012; 2016); Angioni (2007; 2012; 2013; 2014; 
2016). 
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2. A Non-Rationalist Account: from perception and induction to 
demonstration. 
The acquisition of first principles is the topic of the very last chapter 
of the APo. In II 19, Aristotle identifies ‘the state that knows’ (ἡ γνωρίζουσα 
ἕξις, 99b 18) principles with νοῦς, which is characterised as the most ‘accurate’ 
(ἀκριβής) of our cognitive states (100b 5-14). One of Aristotle’s aims in the 
chapter is to address the following puzzle: 
 
I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything 
through a demonstration unless you know the primitive 
immediate principles. As for knowledge of the immediates, 
one might wonder […] whether the states, not being present 
in us, come about in us or rather are present in us without 
being noticed. It is absurd to suppose that we possess such 
states; for then we should possess pieces of knowledge more 
accurate than demonstration without its being noticed. But if 
we get them without possessing them earlier, how could we 
come to acquire knowledge and to learn except from pre-
existing knowledge? This is impossible, as I said in 
connection with demonstration [APo II 19, 99b 20-30; Barnes 
1993 with changes]. 
 
Aristotle discusses two alternative hypotheses about the origin of our 
knowledge of first principles: either (i) it is already present in us without being 
noticed (ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν, 99b25-26) or (ii) it ‘comes about’ (ἐγγίνονται, 99b 
25) in us somehow. It is worth stressing that Aristotle does not consider the 
possibility of first principles being available to us from the beginning, as if they 
were self-evident propositions we could know without any heuristic procedure 
being required. On the contrary, if they are known to us at all – as in 
alternative (i) – we are not completely aware of them (along the lines of Plato’s 
theory of recollection).16 
Aristotle rejects alternative (i) on the grounds that such an ‘accurate’ 
cognitive state – even more accurate than demonstrative knowledge (99b 27) – 
could not be present in us without us noticing them. As stated in hypothesis 
(ii), intelligence (νοῦς) must ‘come about’ in us, which in this context implies 
that first principles are acquired by a process of learning (μανθάνοιμεν, 99b 
29). Since there cannot be learning except from pre-existing knowledge (99b 
28-30) – as the very first sentence of the APo makes it clear (APo I 1, 71a 1-2) 
–, ‘the state that knows’ first principles is not a fundamental cognitive state in 
the sense of not being based on previous knowledge of any kind. This pre-
existing knowledge, however, cannot be ‘more valuable (…) in respect of 
                                                 
16 Some interpreters take hypothesis (i) as referring to Platonic innatism. See Barnes (1993, 261); 
Bronstein (2012, 38-39; 2016, 234). 
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accuracy’ (99b 33-340) than νοῦς, since νοῦς is the most accurate of all 
cognitive states. 
Therefore, the task Aristotle takes on in APo II 19 is to indicate a 
state or capacity that, despite being less accurate than intelligence or 
demonstration, can at least initiate the process that leads us towards these 
higher forms of knowledge17. 
Aristotle goes on to claim that this initial state is a ‘connate 
discriminatory capacity’ (δύναμιν σύμφυτονκριτικήν) known as ‘perception’ 
(αἴσθησιν, 99b 34-35). As an innate capacity, perception does not come from 
pre-existing knowledge nor is it a result of intellectual learning (μάθησις 
διανοητικὴ). Therefore, the principle stated in the opening lines of the APo no 
longer threatens Aristotle’s theory with infinite regress, since it does not apply 
to the capacity that initiates scientific inquiry. However, a feature common to 
all animals such as perception (99b 34) is certainly not enough to give rise to a 
sophisticated form of knowledge such as νοῦς, which means the acquisition of 
first principles requires co-operation with other capacities. First, Aristotle 
recognises ‘memory’ (μνήμη) as indispensable to the process, since the 
information gathered by perception must be retained in our souls in some way 
(100a 3-4). Second, several memories of the same thing must be collected and 
compared with one another, which is made possible by a capacity Aristotle 
calls ‘experience’ (ἐμπειρία, 100a 4-6).18 Experience, in turn, allows us to grasp 
what Aristotle calls ‘the entire universal’ (παντὸςτοῦ καθόλου, 100a 6-7).19 At 
some point, this process ends up with the acquisition of νοῦς (100b 12-14) – 
or, as it is called in this passage, a ‘principle of knowledge’ (ἀρχὴ ἐπιστήμης, 
100a 8; cf. 100b 12-14). 
We might think that, by tracing the acquisition of first principles back 
to perception, Aristotle prevents us from understanding his theory of 
demonstration along the lines of the rationalist interpretation sketched in the 
previous section. However, the capacities discussed in 99b34-100b5 can be 
understood as parts of a process of concept-formation.20 If so, the proponent 
                                                 
17This description of Aristotle’s aim in APo II 19 follows in general lines the interpretation advanced by 
Bronstein (2012; 2016, 225-247), who argues convincingly that the philosopher does not intend in this 
chapter to specify all the steps involved in the acquisition of first principles, but to defend that our 
knowledge of them originates in perception. For a similar view, see Kahn (1981). However, I disagree 
with Kahn and Bronstein in respect of the role of induction in the acquisition of first principles, as will 
become clear soon. 
18 See Metaphysics I 1, 980b 28-982a 1. Cf. Ferejohn (2009, 69), who characterises experience as ‘the 
ability to classify retained percepts into general kinds.’ 
19 I shall set aside the question of whether ‘the grasp of the universal’ is intrinsic to experience (see Ross 
1949, 674; Barnes 1993, 264) or a further, independent step in the acquisition of first principles (see 
McKirahan 1992, 243; Bronstein, 2012, 44-46; 2016, 237-240). 
20 See Barnes (1993, 264-265); Ross (1969, 675-676). On this question, see Kahn (1981, 391-395); 
McKirahan (1992, 246); Charles (2000, 264, n. 37); Bronstein (2012, 58, n. 67; 2016, 246, n.63). 
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of the rationalist interpretation might argue that the first principles we grasp by 
the end of this process are nothing more than propositions specifying the 
meaning of conceptual terms to be used in scientific discourse. 
This reasoning is a non sequitur. From the fact that perception, 
memory and experience might be relevant to concept-formation it does not 
follow that the first principles of science are a priori self-evident propositions 
or that νοῦς is nothing more than an intuitive grasp of the meaning of 
conceptual terms.21 In this chapter, Aristotle is primarily engaged in the task of 
identifying an innate capacity that is not based on pre-existing knowledge and 
therefore can serve as a starting point in our journey towards higher forms of 
cognition. As has been argued, there might well be further steps between the 
last stages described in 99b34-100b5 and the noetic knowledge of first 
principles, a gap Aristotle did not attempt to fill in APo II 19.22 Therefore, it is 
not safe to conclude, only based on APo II 19, that the grasp of first principles 
is nothing more than a process of concept-formation. 
Moreover, Aristotle claims that induction (ἐπαγωγή) is the kind of 
inference underlying the process by which we get from perception to the grasp 
of ‘the entire universal’ (100b 4-5; with 100a 6-7). Therefore, it plays an 
important role in the acquisition of the first principles of science (τὰ πρῶτα, 
100b 3-4).23 It is certainly true that inductive reasoning is part of the process of 
concept-formation. However, this is not the only, nor the most important role 
it plays in scientific inquiry.24 Aristotle seems to have recognised this fact in 
APr II 23, where he offers a sophisticated account of the kinds of reasoning 
involved in the discovery of scientific explanations. Contrary to expectations, 
his account is significantly close to the one proposed by contemporary 
philosophers of science: 
 
Induction, then – that is, a deduction from induction – is 
deducing one extreme to belong to the middle through the 
other extreme, for example, if B is the middle for A and C, 
proving A to belong to B by means of C (for this is how we 
produce inductions). For instance, let A be long-lived, B 
stand for not having bile, and C stand for a particular long-
lived thing, as a man, a horse, or a mule. Now, A belongs to 
the whole C (for every C is long-lived); but B (not having 
                                                 
21Lesher (1973, 61). 
22 See Kahn (1981, 396-397); Bronstein (2012; 2016, 225-247). 
23 In order to avoid the consequence that induction is all it takes to know the first principles, Bronstein 
(2012, 53-54; 2016, 242) argues that ‘τὰ πρῶτα’ in 100b 4 denotes something else (in his words, ‘first 
universals’ and ‘preliminary accounts’). However, in APo II 19, 100b 3-4, the dative ‘ἐπαγωγῇ’ does not 
necessarily mean that induction is sufficient for coming to know the items Aristotle calls ‘τὰ πρῶτα.’ 
Therefore, it is possible to interpret ‘τὰ πρῶτα’ as referring to the first principles of science without 
committing Aristotle to the view that induction is a sufficient condition for grasping them. 
24 I therefore disagree with Kahn (1981, 396) and Bronstein (2012; 2016, 243), who limits the use of 
inductive inferences to the acquisition of nominal definitions. 
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bile) belongs to every C. If, then, C converts with B and the 
middle term does not reach beyond the extreme, then it is 
necessary for A to belong to B: for it has been proved earlier 
that if two terms belong to the same thing and the extreme 
converts with one of them, then the other of the predicates 
will also belong to the term that converts with it. (But one 
must understand C as composed of every one of the 
particulars: for induction is through them all.) [APr II 23, 68b 
15-29; Smith 1989 with changes]. 
  
In this passage, Aristotle is primarily concerned not with ‘induction’ 
(ἐπαγωγή) properly speaking but with an argument derived from it – here 
called ‘deduction from induction’ (ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμός). Let us 
examine Aristotle’s example. 
Scientists investigate biological phenomena by having perceptual 
contact with certain animals (αἴσθησις), retaining images of them (μνήμη) and 
realizing that these animals instantiate certain properties with regularity 
(ἐμπειρία). Let us suppose that, in this process, the biologist finds out a co-
relation between longevity and absence of bile in animals like humans, horses 
and mules. Eventually, an inductive procedure will indicate that all animals of a 
single kind are long-lived whenever their bodies do not contain a significant 
quantity of bile: 
 
Syllogism I (Induction): 
Longevity holds of humans, horses etc., Being a K holds of humans, horses etc. 
Longevity holds of all Ks 
 
Syllogism II (Induction): 
Absence of bile holds of humans, horses etc., Being a K holds of humans, horses etc. 
Absence of bile holds of all Ks 
Relying on this result, the inquirer proceeds to an inference that 
could be described as an ‘inverted demonstration’, where the explanatory term 
is not the middle, but the major extreme:25 
Syllogism III (Abduction): 
Longevity holds of all animals of the kind K, Being bileless holds of all animals of the kind K 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals 
 
In fact, the co-occurrence of longevity and absence of bile made 
Aristotle believe that, in certain animals, the latter is the explanation of the 
                                                 
25 The terms called ‘middle’ and ‘extreme’ in APr II 23, 68b 15-18 do not match the roles they play in the 
syllogism discussed in the passage, which means that these expressions are used as rigid designators of 
the middle term and the extremes of a demonstrative syllogism. See Ross (1949, 484-485). 
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former.26 Thus, in the argument above, the explanans appears in the conclusion 
while the explanandum occurs in the major premise – an inference one could 
classify as abductive. However, while the so-called ‘inferences to the best 
explanation’ are non-deductive, Aristotle believes that, if the induction that 
precedes it is sufficiently comprehensive, we can obtain a deduction to the best 
explanation. Lines 68b 24-27 refer back to APr II 22, 68a 21-25, where 
Aristotle has shown that if two terms A and B hold of all C, and C also holds 
of all B, then A necessarily holds of all B. Therefore, if the induction shows us 
that all and only the members of the relevant kind are bileless – and perhaps 
this is what Aristotle means by the enigmatic phrase ‘the entire universal’ in 
APo II 19 (παντὸς τοῦ καθόλου, 100a 6-7) –, we are warranted to convert the 
previous major premise and obtain ‘a deduction from induction’ concluding 
that all bileless animals are long-lived: 
 
Syllogism IV (Deduction from Induction): 
Longevity holds of all animals of a kind K, Being a K holds of all bileless animals 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals 
 
Apparently, in APr II 23, Aristotle offers an account of the 
acquisition of explanations which is (to a certain extent) close to the one 
advanced by modern philosophers of science. However, none of the steps 
discussed in the chapter contain ‘ἀποδείξεις’ in the strict sense of the term, in 
which the explanation occurs as the middle term: 
 
Syllogism V (Demonstration): 
Longevity holds of all bileless animals, Being bileless holds of all animals of the kind K 
Longevity holds of all animals of the kind K 
 
Thus, the chapter leaves us without an answer to the question of how 
exactly can scientists learn by demonstration. 
Interpreters such as Kosman (1973, 383) and McKirahan (1992, 243) 
distinguish between knowing an explanation and knowing an explanation as 
such. Based on this distinction, David Bronstein has recently argued that there 
is a sense in which it is possible to learn by demonstration: if p1 is explained by 
p2, demonstration is the reasoning by which a scientist learns that p2 is actually 
explanatory of p1 (and not simply that p2 is the case).27Let me endorse 
                                                 
26Parts of Animals IV 2, 676a 30-677b 10. 
27‘Learning by demonstration, I suggest, does not consist in deducing a new conclusion from known 
premises. Rather, it consists in discovering a previously unknown explanatory connection among facts 
the scientist already knows but not scientifically. Prior to learning, she knows x and y, where y is the 
explanation of x and x is explained by y, but she does not know x or y as such. She learns by 
demonstration when she apprehends y as explanatory of x, or—what is the same thing—x as explained 
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Bronstein’s interpretation in the following terms. Inductive and abductive 
arguments merely make it reasonable to accept their conclusions as true, since 
what they infer is not a necessary consequence of their premises. On the other 
hand, the argument Aristotle calls ‘deduction from induction’, despite having 
premises that do necessitate the conclusion, does nothing more than establish 
that the explanansis true, which is quite different from establishing that it is the 
adequate explanation of the explanandum in question.28 Knowing that all bileless 
animals are long-lived is different from knowing that this is the reason why 
horses and mules are long-lived.For Aristotle, only the second case is qualified 
as scientific knowledge and only demonstrations are able to provide it. A true 
expert scientist not only assents to a set of true propositions, but also 
organizes it in terms of explanatory priority. By demonstrating a given 
proposition taken as an explanandum, she not only knows that the 
correspondent explanans is true, but also realizes that the explanandum follows 
from the explanans and organizes her discourse accordingly, choosing as 
premises propositions that are explanatorily prior to the respective 
conclusions. 
The question of how exactly we are able to recognize causal 
connections in the world does not seem to have bothered Aristotle (in the 
same way as it has bothered Hume, for instance). As a result, he never explains 
in a clear way (as far as I know) how the scientist realizes that a proposition p1 
is explanatory of p2. However, if my interpretation of APr II 23 is correct, we 
can at least affirm that this recognition occurs at some point between 
Syllogism IV and Syllogism V. If it happens after Syllogism IV, by the time the 
scientist recognizes p1 as explanatory of p2, she already knows that p1 and p2 
are true. Therefore, what she learns ‘by demonstration’ cannot be the truth-
value of problematic propositions. One the other hand, if the recognition of 
causal relations happens before Syllogism V, one might object that 
demonstration is not the reasoning by which the scientist learns that 
something is causally prior to another, but just a way of exposing this causal 
priority in scientific discourse. If so, there is nothing the expert scientist really 
learns ‘by demonstration’. How then are we supposed to understand 
Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘learning by demonstration’? Let me suggest 
the following solution. The term ‘demonstration’ is ambiguous: in one sense of 
the term, ‘demonstration’ is the name of a reasoning (a proof-search 
procedure, one could say) in which a scientist tries to identify propositions 
(already known to be true) from which a given conclusion(also known to be 
true) can be deduced and explained; in another sense, ‘demonstration’ is just 
the name of the syllogistically structured sequence of sentences that results 
                                                                                                       
by y. As a result of her learning, she now has scientific knowledge of x, which she previously knew only 
non-scientifically [Bronstein 2012, 14].’ 
28 See Kosman (1973, 383); McKirahan (1992, 243). Bronstein (2014, 14; 2016, 39-40).  
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from this procedure.29In the first sense, Aristotle could say that expert 
scientists learn ‘by demonstration’ without contradicting his claim that 
knowing that the explanandum is true is a necessary condition for investigating 
the explanans. The acquisition of demonstrative knowledge involves 
overcoming the ordo cognoscendi and making scientific discourse reproduce the 
ordo essendi; to demonstrate (in the first sense of ‘demonstration’) is to realize 
that and how this is possible. 
Finally, it is worth noting that even though Aristotle requires the 
explanandum to be a logical consequence of the explanans, his theory remains 
quite different from the deductive-nomological models of explanation. For 
him, what makes a scientific proposition prior to another is something more 
than their difference in generality or the inferential connections between them 
(APo I 13, 78a 22-b3; II 16, 98b 16-24). As we can see, demonstrations include 
as premises the same sentences we would find in abductive arguments, but the 
inference goes in the opposite direction. The inferential steps discussed in APr 
II 23 enable the scientist to grasp a set of true propositions, whereas in the 
demonstrative stage this body of truths is organized in terms of causal priority 
– that is, priority ‘by nature.’ In other words, a demonstration of a conclusion 
c allows us to know not only (i) that c can be logically derived from a set of 
true premises Π but also (ii) that Π presents the set of factors responsible for 
c being true (which are prior to c ‘by nature’), instead of the factors which 
make us believe that c is true (which are prior to c only ‘relative to us’)30. 
 
3. Interdependence between νοῦς and demonstrative knowledge 
What about our knowledge of first principles? Some authors have 
pointed out that to understand first principles – that is, to have νοῦς of them – 
is to understand them as principles.31 As we know, first principles are nothing 
more than ultimate explanations. If inductions or ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆ ςσυλλογισμοί 
do not make us know explanations as explanations, the same should apply to 
first principles as first principles. But what does it mean to know a principle as 
                                                 
29 Bronstein (2016, 41) seems to reply to this objection with a similar distinction between two senses of 
‘demonstration’ – although it is not completely clear to me whether the senses of ‘demonstration’ he 
briefly discusses are the same two senses I have tried to discriminate. 
30 For the differences between Aristotle’s and the ‘covering law’ theory of scientific explanation, see 
McKirahan (1992, 230-231). See also Brody (1972) for the advantages of the former over the latter. 
31Kosman (1973, 389) argues: ‘[…] the noetic grasp we have of them [first principles] as principles 
concerns our ability to use them in explaining and making intelligible the world of phenomena. Nοῦς 
therefore is a feature of our understanding of all explanatory principles or premises […] just insofar as we 
understand them in the act of explaining by them, i.e. just insofar as we understand them qua principles 
and not qua explicanda [emphasis in original].’ See also McKirahan (1992, 243-244). 
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principle? Based on our discussion so far, we can define an Aristotelian first 
principle in the following terms: 
 
Def. (First Principle): p is a first principle iff.  
(i) there is an Aristotelian demonstration ⟨Π, c⟩ such that p 
belongs in Π 
(ii) there is no set Ψ such that ⟨Ψ, p⟩ is an Aristotelian 
demonstration of p. 
 
According to this definition, to know a principle p as a first principle is 
to know that p satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Whereas condition (ii) accounts 
for the indemonstrability of first principles, condition (i) states that a principle 
is always a principle of something. In APo I 2, 71b 19-22, Aristotle lists six 
features of demonstrative principles: they are ‘true and primitive and 
immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the 
conclusion’ (APo I 2, 71b 19-22). At least three of these features are relative to 
a conclusion: ‘more familiar than’, ‘prior to’ and ‘explanatory of.’32 Therefore, 
to grasp a first principle as such is to understand it as an indemonstrable 
premise from which one or more conclusions are demonstrated. 
This result is in accordance with part of the secondary literature, 
which claims that both noetic and demonstrative knowledge involves a holistic 
outlook of a given body of truths. Interpreters such as Kosman (1973) and 
Myles Burnyeat (1981) have argued that to understand (ἐπίστασθαι) a 
proposition pi is to determine its place in a complex web of interrelated 
propositions p1, p2, … , pn organized in terms of explanatory priority, either as 
a first principle (noetic understanding) or as a theorem (demonstrative 
understanding).33Along the same lines, McKirahan (1992, 243-244) affirms: ‘to 
                                                 
32 See McKirahan (1992, 243); Ross (1949, 509); Barnes (1993, 93). Ferejohn (2009, 78-79) criticises 
McKirahan for being ‘apparently impressed by Aristotle’s use of comparatives in APo I 2, 71b 19-22.’ 
Alternatively, he takes the three ‘relational’ conditions as reducible to a single ‘absolute’ condition: 
‘intelligibility in nature.’ However, the notion ‘intelligibility in nature’ seems more obscure than the 
conditions it is supposed to clarify. More significantly, Aristotle explicitly takes the condition ‘being 
explanatory of’ as the fundamental one (APo I 2, 71b 29-33). The fact that these three requirements are 
relational does not imply that ‘there are no objective and context-independent features that make 
somethings acceptable as principles and other things not’ (FEREJOHN, 2009, 78). Since Aristotle is not 
concerned with mere justification (as Ferejohn seems to assume), what makes something a principle in 
his theory is something objective: the causal order of the reality. In other words, the principles are 
relational in the sense of being prior to other propositions, but objective in the sense of being prior ‘in 
nature’ and not ‘relative to us.’ For an approach that expands this ‘relational’ aspect of the notion of 
principle to the other requirements and to its ‘necessity’, see Angioni (2012) and Angioni (2014), 
respectively. 
33Ferejohn (2009, 75) objects that interpretations like Kosman’s associate Aristotle with coherentism, in 
opposition to the foundationalist view advanced in the APo. In the same vein, one could say that our 
interpretation also commits Aristotle to some sort of coherentism. However, we would be ascribing a 
coherentist doctrine to Aristotle only if we were saying that organizing scientific propositions in a coherent 
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grasp something as a principle is to understand how the things of which it is a 
principle depend on it. […] Thus, knowing principles entails appropriate 
knowledge of non principles.’ 
If our interpretation is correct, νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική can 
be considered interdependent in a certain way. Demonstrative knowledge in 
the strict sense involves knowing not only the proximate causes of a given 
phenomenon, but the ultimate ones as well. In other words, if ⟨Π, c⟩ is a full-
fledged demonstration, there must be a subset of Π containing only 
indemonstrable premises, of which we have not ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική but 
νοῦς. Therefore, ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική is dependent on νοῦς insofar as full-
fledged demonstrative knowledge is impossible without intelligence of first 
principles. Nevertheless, a proposition cannot be considered a first principle of 
science independently of their explanatory roles in demonstrations. If νοῦς is the 
knowledge of first principles as first principles, its acquisition depends on 
figuring out their position in the body of science as a whole, which involves 
the practise of demonstrating other, less basic propositions from them. 
Therefore, if APo II 19 does not account for all the steps involved in the 
acquisition of first principles, this gap is filled by the very practise of 
demonstrating – where ‘demonstrating’ is to be understood in our first sense 
of ‘demonstration’ (i.e. the reasoning underlying a proof-search procedure). 
Such account of the relation between νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη 
ἀποδεικτική is in accordance with the way in which, according to Aristotle, we 
come to know definitions. In APo II 10, the philosopher distinguishes 
definitional sentences that are mere accounts of meaning (93b 19-37) – or 
‘nominal definitions’ – from definitions as accounts of essence – or ‘real 
definitions’ (93b 38-94a 7). According to Aristotle, a definition of the second 
kind is ‘an account which displays the reason why’ (λόγος ὁ δηλῶν διὰ τί 
ἔστιν, 93b 39). We know first principles are not self-evident propositions from 
which problematic beliefs can be justified, but causal explanations acquired 
after a complex process of inquiry (involving perception, memory, experience, 
induction etc.). Therefore, in virtue of their causal or explanatory content, real 
(and not merely nominal) definitions are the propositions playing the role of 
first principles in Aristotle’s theory. In APo II 8-10, it becomes clear that 
causal definitions of this sort are not grasped independently of the practise of 
demonstrating, as I shall argue now. 
                                                                                                       
body is the method by which scientists get to know explanatory relations. This is not what I am proposing 
– and, if I understand his interpretation correctly, neither is Kosman. What requires a holistic 
understanding of the body of scientific truths is not the recognition of a particular explanatory relation 
between two propositions, but the recognition of first principles as such – after all, figuring out that p is a 
principle involves realizing that there is no other proposition from which p can be demonstrated. I am 
grateful to an anonymous referee on this issue. 
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In APoII, Aristotle engages in a long discussion about whether or not 
definitions can be demonstrated. His final answer is negative. Although it is 
possible to elaborate sound syllogisms whose conclusions are definitional 
sentences, such arguments are merely ‘logical’ (λογικὸς), without real 
explanatory force (APo II 8, 93a 9-15).After denying that definitions can be 
conclusions of demonstrations (APo II 8, 93a 9-15), Aristotle announces his 
aim in APo II 8: ‘let us say in what way a demonstration [of what something is] 
is possible, starting again from the beginning’ (93a 15-16). ‘Starting again from 
the beginning’ (πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς), in this context, refers back to APo II 1-2, 
where Aristotle recognizes equivalencies between the following four questions: 
 
(Q1) Does P holds of S? ≡ (Q3) Does P exist? 
(Q2) Why does P holds of S? ≡ (Q4) What is P? 
Additionally, the philosopher affirms that these questions can be 
reduced to questions about a middle term: 
(Q1/Q3) Is there an M such that PaM, MaS⊦PaS& M is the reason 
why PaS? 
(Q2/Q4) What is M such that PaM, MaS⊦PaS& M is the reason why 
PaS? 
 
From these equivalencies, it follows that there is an isomorphism 
between the definition of P and the explanation of S being P. For instance, we 
explain why the specific noise we call ‘thunder’ holds of clouds through the 
middle term ‘extinction of fire’ (APo II 8, 93a 7-b14): 
 
Syllogism VI: 
Noise holds of extinction of fire, Extinction of fire holds of clouds 
Noise holds of clouds 
 
Thus, if we rearrange Syllogism VI in a propositional structure, we 
get the definition of thunder: 
 
Thunder is(df.) noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds (APo II 10, 94a 5-6). 
Even if Syllogism VI is not a demonstration of a definition – in the 
sense of having a definition as its conclusion –, it displays or reveals the essence 
of thunder. Therefore, Aristotle can conclude his reasoning as follows: 
 
We have said how what something is taken and becomes 
familiar. Although there are no syllogisms and no 
demonstrations of what something is, nevertheless what 
something is made plain through syllogisms and through 
demonstrations. Hence without a demonstration you cannot 
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get to know what something is [APo II 8, 93b 15-18; Barnes 
1993]. 
 
The isomorphism between the definition of thunder and Syllogism 
VI is not just a coincidence of results of two independent scientific practises: 
defining and explaining. On the contrary, we cannot know the essence of 
something independently of the explanatory role it plays in a demonstration: 
οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἔστι γνῶναι τὸ τί ἐστιν (93b 18-19). In other words, the 
way we acquire knowledge of definitions intrinsically involves the act of 
explaining phenomena by demonstration.34 
However, in APo II 9, 93b 21, Aristotle affirms that only the essence 
of things ‘whose cause is something different’ is made clear through 
demonstrations (93b 25-28). It has been argued that this passage is meant to 
show that the interdependence between defining and explaining holds good 
for the essence of processes and attributes such as thunder and eclipse (whose 
essences would be causally complex), but not the essence of substances such 
as human or moon (whose essences would be causally simple).35I believe this 
interpretation is mistaken for the following reasons. 
First, Aristotle’s own examples in APo II 8, 93a 22-24, include 
‘human’ and ‘soul’, which suggests that the isomorphism between definition 
and demonstration applies to substances as well.36In fact, in Metaphysics VII 17 
and VIII 2-4, Aristotle explicitly extends the model presented in the Analytics 
to include substance-kinds. As we saw, the question ‘what is thunder?’ can be 
analysed as ‘why does such-and-such noise happens to the clouds?’. Similarly, 
the question ‘what is a human being?’ is equivalent to ‘why is this kind of body 
arranged in such-and-such way?’ This last question is answered by a syllogism 
of the following form: 
 
Syllogism VII: 
This arrangement holds of being rational soul, being a rational soul holds of this type of body 
This arrangement holds of this type of body. 
 
Correspondingly, the definition of human being would run as 
follows: 
Human beingis(df.) a body arranged in such-and-such way for the sake of being a 
rational soul.37 
On the other hand, the example of an ‘item whose cause is not 
something else’ offered in the chapter is ‘unit’, which suggests that the 
                                                 
34 See Kung (1977, 168-172); Charles (2000; 2010; 2014); Williams & Charles (2013); Peramatzis (2011, 
180-188; 2013); Angioni (2012; 2014). 
35Ross (1969, 633); Bronstein (2016, 131-143). 
36Peramatzis (2011, 11). 
37 See Charles (2000; 2010, 268-328); Peramatzis (2011, 180-200; 2013, 303-305). 
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exceptions to the interdependence of defining and explaining are conceptually 
simple notions, rather than hylemorphic compounds. 
Moreover, and more importantly, our main thesis remains true even 
for definienda such as ‘unit’: although its definition is merely ‘supposed’ by 
arithmeticians and not discovered through any demonstrative practise (93b 22-
25), its status as a first principle depends on its being used to explain 
arithmetic theorems. Consequently, even if Aristotle did not recognised in the 
APo an isomorphism between definition and demonstration in the case of 
substances, there is a way in which the scientific practises of defining and 
explaining would remain interdependent. This result is supported by a famous 
passage in De Anima I 1: 
 
It seems that not only is ascertaining what a thing is useful for 
considering the causes of the properties of substances […], 
but also, conversely, that ascertaining the properties of a 
substance plays a great part in knowing what a thing is. […] 
For the principle of every demonstration is what a thing is, so 
that those definitions which do not lead us to ascertain the 
properties of a substance, or at least to know them in a ready 
sort of way, will clearly and in every case be dialectical and 
vacuous [De Anima I 1, 402b 16-403a 2; Shields 2016 with 
changes]. 
 
In this passage, Aristotle is relying on the claim that what 
characterizes the essence of a substance – in comparison with other necessary 
(but non-essential) properties – is its being explanatorily basic, i.e. their 
presence in the substance explains the substance’s having other derivative 
properties, but is not explained by any other property the substance may have. 
Thus, to know the essence of a substance as the essence of that substance involves 
realizing that it is explanatory of its demonstrable attributes. Similarly, to 
recognize a proposition as an authentic definition (and not merely ‘dialectical and 
vacuous’) involves realizing that certain phenomena can be demonstrated from 
them. This result is in accordance with our account of the relation between 
demonstrative knowledge and νοῦς. Νοῦς is the cognitive state that knows 
definitions. Since demonstrations are based on definitions, demonstrative 
knowledge is dependent on νοῦς. However, if we cannot get to know a 
definition independently of the act of demonstrating, one cannot have νοῦς 
without having demonstrative knowledge. The interdependence of these two 
kinds of knowledge just mirrors the interdependence between defining and 
explaning. 
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4. Objections and Replies 
Let me now address some objections than might be raised against my 
proposal. I have claimed that to have νοῦς of first principles is to know them 
as first principles, which involves understanding them as satisfying all the six 
requirements mentioned in APo I 2, 71b 19-22, including the relational ones: 
being ‘more familiar than…’, ‘prior to…’ and ‘explanatory of…’. David 
Bronstein (2016, 62-63) has argued that if this is so, νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη 
ἀποδεικτική turn out to be one and the same cognitive state. If ⟨{p1, p2}, c⟩ is 
a demonstration, having demonstrative knowledge of c is to know c as 
explained by premises p1 and p2. On the other hand, to know that p1 and p2 
satisfy the relational criteria is to know them as explanatory of c. However, 
‘knowing c as explained by p1 and p2’ and ‘knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of 
c’ are, according to him, ‘two descriptions of the same cognitive state’.38 
However, my claim is that having νοῦς of p1 and p2 involves 
determining their places in a given body of interrelated propositions and 
realizing that: (i) there are no propositions within it from which p1 or p2 can be 
demonstrated; (ii) there are one or more propositions that can be 
demonstrated from p1, as well as there are one or more propositions that can 
be demonstrated from p2 – leaving it open whether p1 or p2 can be used to 
demonstrate the same proposition.39 Thus, νοῦς depends on there being 
demonstrative knowledge of one proposition or other. That being said, we can 
reply to this first objection as follows. If p1 and p2 are the first principles from 
which c is demonstrated, having demonstrative knowledge of c requires 
having noetic knowledge of p1 and p2. Nevertheless, although noetic 
knowledge of p1 and p2 requires a comprehensive understanding of a given 
body of truths (and the explanatory role of p1 and p2 within it), it does not 
require knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c specifically. Therefore, even if the 
expressions ‘knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c’ and ‘knowing c as 
explained by p1 and p2’ describe the same piece of knowledge – a claim which 
is by itself controversial – ‘knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c’ in which ‘c’ 
stands for an determinate conclusion is not a good description of the kind of 
holistic cognition Aristotle calls ‘νοῦς.’ 
In fact, if the content of noetic knowledge of p1 and p2 could not be 
specified without mentioning a specific conclusion such as c, it would be 
difficult to sustain that an expert scientist could learn by demonstration in the 
way we agreed she could. After all, if having νοῦς of p1 and p2 already involves 
knowing p1 and p2 as explanatory of c, the scientist will learn nothing when 
                                                 
38Bronstein (2016, 62). 
39Certainly, clause (ii) does not require a demonstrative knowledge established previously and 
independently of νοῦς. Therefore, my view does not imply that there is one piece of demonstrative 
knowledge which is prior to νοῦς in time. 
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she tries to demonstrate c from p1 and p2.40 On the other hand, if coming to 
know p1 and p2 as principles involves realizing that there are true propositions 
that can be demonstrated from them (which are not necessarily c), there is still 
room for discovering new explananda (possibly c) and trying to trace them back 
to the first principles. Let us consider, for instance, an expert biologist who 
discovered (through the inferences and capacities described in APo II 23 and 
APo II 19) that absence of bile causes animals such as horses, mules and 
camels to be long-lived. Let us also say that it has already been established that 
all these species are essentially blooded animals (which involves knowing that 
some of their properties are explained by their being blooded). If the biologist 
tries to explain their longevity from first principles, she will eventually find out 
that absence of bile is the cause of their being long-lived because the liver (of 
which bile is a residue) is vital and necessary to all blooded animals. Thus, she 
will have learned by demonstration that certain blooded animals are long-lived 
having previous noetic knowledge that their essence involves their being 
blooded.41 
However, even if there is a way of distinguishing one cognitive state 
from the other, a second objection could be raised. In APo II 19, Aristotle 
claims that νοῦς is ‘more accurate’ (ἀκριβέστερον) than demonstrative 
knowledge. One might argue that we cannot explain this claim if we take these 
two cognitive states as interdependent. On the other hand, the rationalist 
interpretation would take this claim in purely subjective terms: the first 
principles are self-evident and accepted as true without any justification, 
whereas the respective conclusions become evident to us only through the 
evidence of the principles. Thus, the rationalist interpretation is able to explain 
how the ‘accuracy’ of demonstrative knowledge depends on the ‘accuracy’ of 
νοῦς but not vice-versa. 
First, the claim that νοῦς is the most ‘accurate’ type of knowledge 
does not need to be understood in subjective or psychological terms, as if the 
content of noetic knowledge were somehow ‘more evident’ than the content 
of other cognitive states. As we have seen, Aristotle describes the premises of 
a demonstration as being ‘more familiar’ or ‘more intelligible’ (γνωριμωτέρα) 
than the conclusion. At first sight, this vocabulary might suggest that our 
mental attitudes towards these premises are at stake. Nevertheless, the feature 
of demonstrative premises Aristotle wants to stress is fully objective: by ‘more 
familiar’ he means not ‘more familiar to us’ (a subjective notion) but ‘more 
familiar by nature’, which amounts to the objective notion of causal or 
explanatory priority (APo I 2, 71b 31). Lesher (2010), for instance, has 
convincingly argued that ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια) in Aristotle is not necessarily a 
                                                 
40 As Bronstein (2016, 65) himself notes. 
41 See Parts of Animals IV 2, 677ª-b10. If this pattern describes Aristotle in his biological treatises, it might 
count as further evidence for my interpretation the fact it is in accordance with his scientific practise. 
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psychological notion, the same being true for the notion of ‘accuracy’ (τὸ 
ἀκριβές). He points out that in several contexts Aristotle uses those terms to 
refer to ‘the attainment of full scientific knowledge’ (Lesher2010, 148-156). 
Now, as I have argued, if⟨{p1, p2}, c⟩ is the demonstration of c, one cannot 
have demonstrative knowledge of c without having noetic knowledge of p1 
and p2. However, having νοῦς of p1 and p2 does not require demonstrative 
knowledge of c specifically. Therefore, the content of noetic knowledge (e.g. 
knowing p1 and p2 as principles) is more comprehensive and complete in 
comparison with the more specific content of the correspondent piece of 
demonstrative knowledge (e.g. knowing c as explained by p1 and p2) – and this 
could be what Aristotle had in mind when he claimed that νοῦς is the most 
‘accurate’ of all cognitive states. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
If ‘foundationalism’ is understood as a theory on epistemic 
justification – according to which we establish a given conclusion by deriving 
it from self-evident truths known by non-inferential procedures – Aristotle is 
not foundationalist. First, conclusions of demonstrations can be deduced from 
their respective premises and vice-versa, which means that the priority of the 
premises over the conclusion is not determined by inferential connections 
between them. Second, such priority cannot be explained in terms of evidence, 
since the premises are more familiar ‘by nature’ and not ‘relative to us’. After 
all, the knowledge of first principles is the final result of a complex inquiry 
which has perceptual knowledge as its starting point. Third, the status of a 
proposition p as a first principle does not rely (primarily) on a feature that p 
has in itself, such as being self-evident or analytically true. Rather, it depends 
on p being explanatory of other propositions and no other proposition being 
explanatory oh p. Consequently, νοῦς is not an intuitive grasp of self-evident 
propositions, which could be obtained independently of the practise of 
demonstrating conclusions from essence-specifying definitions. On the 
contrary, noetic and demonstrative knowledge are interdependent cognitive 
states in the same way as defining and explaining are interdependent scientific 
practises. If Aristotle can be correctly described as a ‘foundationalist’ in the 
first place, his ‘foundationalism’ amounts to the recognition of ultimate 
explanatory factors, a.k.a. ‘essences’.42 
                                                 
42Many thanks to Lucas Angioni and Michailv Peramatzis for invaluable remarks on drafts of this paper. I 
am also thankful to Benjamin Morison for insightful questions and comments on some of my claims. A 
previous version of this article was presented at the conference Nature and Knowledge in Plato and 
Aristotle organized by Prof. Lucas Angioni at the University of Campinas. I am indebted to all 
participants, including Lucas Angioni, David Ebrey, Barbara Sattler, Vasilis Politis, Raphael Zillig, Daniel 
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